Introduction
In an attempts to redirect, among feminists representing a variety of philosophical traditions, a discussion of feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of science.1 I pursue two lines of argument. The first is that critiques of feminist epistemology offered by feminist theorists and mainstream episte- mologists have relied on questionable views of both epistemology and feminist epistemology. The second line of argument builds on the first to advocate the view that epistemology is radically interdependent with other knowledge, undertakings, and interests-a view I claim is commensurate with epistemology’s history and promising for feminist theory. In the course of these arguments, three ironies emerge. One is that, their different motivations notwithstanding, it is on the basis of premises they share that many feminists and mainstream epistemologists have been led to the view that the very idea of feminist epistemology is incongruous. A second irony is that some of these shared premises are effectively undermined by feminist analyses and critiques of epistemology. The third is that some of these premises are incommensurate with the standards their mainstream advocates claim to uphold. I begin by noting a fourth irony. The more interesting and vexing issues at the intersections of feminism, epistemology, and the philosophy of science will not be resolved by conceptual analysis alone. The juxtapositions encompassed in the phrases “feminist epistemology” and “feminist philosophy of science,
for example, which strike some feminist theorists and mainstream epistemol- ogists as incongruous, strike others of us as only apparently incongruous and as roughly locating research agendas whose pursuit will help us become clearer about the nature of knowledge, of science, and of theories about them.2 These juxtapositions often signal the view that epistemology and the philosophy of science are not (and perhaps could not be) what some of their practitioners and advocates have wanted or claimed them to be-but also are not “dead,” as some of their critics proclaim. In the end, the worth of research undertaken under these rubrics will be determined not by discussions such as this, but by criteria appropriate to judging any research program carrying substantial empirical content. Such criteria include whether the results achieved are commensurate with our experiences, including women’s experiences, or, alternatively, point to more coherent reconstructions of these; and the contributions made to more viable accounts of knowledge and epistemic communities, and to better knowledge and epistemic practices (Addelson 1993a; Code 1991). Although feminist scholarship provides sufficient warrant for forays into the nature of knowledge, science, and theories about them, final judgments of the significance of these forays are not yet possible. And it would be less than forthright not to acknowledge that the impact of these forays will be determined in part by factors other than the criteria just outlined. Claims to knowledge and about it constitute claims to cognitive authority, and these are political and socially mediated. Why, then, engage in the kind of analysis undertaken here? Because here, in the interim, we ask ourselves and are asked by our nonfeminist colleagues about the nature of the relationships between feminist analyses of knowledge, feminist politics, and epistemology and the philosophy of science “proper.” Our answers, however qualified and tentative, have some bearing on how our work is received and on our own practices. Consider, for example, the recent call for papers for a special issue of The Monist devoted to the astonishing topic “Feminist Epistemology-For and Against,” which suggested that whether one is “for” or “against” “feminist epistemology” is a matter of subscribing to one of two clearly delineated, complete, and mutually exclusive sets of tenets.3 I contend that the call badly mischaracterized much of the work at the intersections of feminism, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. But I am also concerned that some of us working at these intersections have offered arguments which imply much the same.4 Our tentative answers to questions about the relationship between feminist analyses of knowledge and epistemology “proper” also shape our evaluation of and openness to each other’s approaches. Consider, for example, our apparent acceptance of the analytic/Continental and other divides-an acceptance reflected in debates within feminist theory about the future of epistemology.