EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON THE INVESTMENT VOLUME OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
Corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefits (Frewen and Campbell, 2012). It includes bribery, extortion, fraud, abuse of power, embezzlement, conflicts of interest and nepotism. The presence of corruption can negatively affect the economics and functioning of the market, especially companies investments, because of higher cost of operations.
Although corruption generally has adverse effects, some theories and empirical studies argue that these unethical practices can be positive and infact, there are companies that invest and increase their operations in location despite the presence of high levels of corruption, which shows that corruption does not influence investment in particular circumstances (Asiedu and freeman, 2009). Thus, although corruption intuitively should have adverse consequences for the economy, evidence of its impact on business activities points to both negative and positive results, and this hinders an understanding of how it affected specific managerial decisions.
An analysis of the impact of corruption on the investment volume in public private partnership protects might be especially interesting. First, as corruption related to public power, public-private corruption relates to public power, public-private partnerships can be especially sensitive to the degree of corruption of the institutions involved, given that one of the partners in these relationship is a public party, second public-private partnership arguments tends to be large. Specific investments (Fleta-Asin and Munoz, 2019: World Bank, 2016). And are therefore more sensitive to unethical practices because they are difficult to audit. Third public-private partnerships have become widespread in a large number of economics in recent decades (World Bank, 2020). This public-private partnerships and the frameworks in which they are implemented emerge as the perfect laboratory in which to study how corruption affects sensitive economic activities.
Statement of the Problem
Corruption has the potential to affect the investment volume of both private and public enterprises either positively or negatively. Corruptions acts in private and public enterprises include; dishonesty, indiscipline, nepotism, favouritism or discrimination and partiality in decision making or allocation of values. Corruption thus represented degeneration from the normal that is an anti-social behavior. For this reasons, many enterprises try to formulate ethical factors, many enterprises try to formulate ethical factors and strategic policies, that could reduce the level of corruption in their enterprises. A public-private partnership process marred by corruption could result in a poorly investment turnover as a large chunk of funds would be diverted to bribing public officials. This study therefore seeks to investigate the effect of corruption on the investment volume of enterprises with a view to reducing or eradicating corruption in the investment volume of public-private partnership.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page – – – – – – – – – i
Approval page – – – – – – – – ii
Certification – – – – – – – – iii
Dedication – – – – – – – – – iv
Acknowledgments – – – – – – – v
Abstract – – – – – – – – – vii
Table of contents – – – – – – – – viii
List of Tables – – – – – – – – xii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
- Background of the study – – – – – 1
- Statement of hypotheses – – – – – 2
- Objectives of the study – – – – – – 3
- Research Questions – – – – – – 4
- Statement of hypotheses – – – – – 4
- Significance of the study – – – – – 5
- Scope of the study – – – – – – 6
- Limitations of the study – – – – – 6
- Organization of the study – – – – – 7
- Definition of terms – – – – – – 8
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1 Conceptual framework – – – – – 9
2.1.1 Concept and meaning of corruption – – – 9
2.1.2 Causes of corruption in public-private partnership – – 11
2.1.3 Specific factors affecting investment and corruption – 12
2.1.4 Impact of corruption on the profitability level of
public private enterprises – – – – – 14
2.1.5 Effect of trade restrictions on investment volume of
public-private enterprises in Akwa Ibom State – – 16
2.1.6 Unethical behavior and corruption as governance problems in
public-private partnership – – – – – 17
2.1.7 Management implications and limitations of corruption – 18
2.1.8 Preventing corruption in public-private partnership – 20
2.2 Theoretical framework – – – – – – 23
2.2.1 The principal-agent theory of corruption – – – 24
2.2.2 Collective action theory of corruption – – – 24
2.2.3 Institutional theory of corruption – – – – 26
2.3 Empirical framework – – – – – – 27
2.3.1 The effect and consequences of public sector corruption in
Enugu, Nigeria (Ezinwa, 2010) – – – – 27
2.3.2 The impact of corruption on economic growth
(Rano and Akanni, 2009) – – – – – 28
2.3.3 The effects of capital account liberalization on the long-run
growth of a developing country (Rivera-Batiz, 2001) – 29
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Design – – – – – – – 30
3.2 Population of the study – – – – – – 31
3.3 Sampling techniques – – – – – – 31
3.4 Sample size – – – – – – – 31
3.5 Instrumentation – – – – – – – 33
3.6 Method of data analysis – – – – – 33
3.7 Problems of data collection – – – – – 36
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
4.1 Analysis of research questions – – – – 37
4.1.1 Analysis of research question one – – – – 37
4.1.2 Analysis of research Question two – – – – 39
4.1.3 Analysis of research question three – – – 41
4.2 Analysis of hypothesis – – – – – – 42
4.2.1 Test of hypothesis one – – – – – – 42
4.2.2 Test of hypothesis two – – – – – – 46
4.2.3 Test of hypothesis three – – – – – 49
4.3 Discussion of findings – – – – – – 53
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary of findings – – – – – – – 56
5.2 Conclusion – – – – – – – – 57
5.3 Recommendations – – – – – – 57
References
Appendices
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1.1: Responses to research question one – – – 38
Table 4.1.2: Responses to Research Question Two – – 39
Table 4.1.3: Responses to research question three – – 41
Table 4.2.1A: Observed frequency for Hypothesis one – – 43
Table 4.2.1B: Expected frequency for Hypothesis one – – 44
Table 4.2.1C: Comparison of the observed with Expected
frequencies of Hypothesis one – – – – 44
Table 4.2.2A: Observed frequency for hypothesis two – – 46
Table 4.2.2B: Expected frequency for hypothesis two – – 47
Table 4.2.2C: Comparison of the observed with Expected
frequencies of Hypothesis two – – – – 48
Table 4.2.3A: Observed frequency for hypothesis three – 50
Table 4.2.3B: Expected frequency for hypothesis three – 51
Table 4.2.2C: Comparison of the observed with
Expected frequencies of Hypothesis two – – – 52